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Abstract. We study and compare two frameworks: a model of influence, and command games. In
the influence model, in which players are to make a certain acceptance/rejection decision, due to
influence of other players, the decision of a player may be different from his inclination. We study
a relation between two central concepts of this model: influence function, and follower function.
We deliver sufficient and necessary conditions for a function to be a follower function, and we
describe the structure of the set of all influence functions that lead to a given follower function.
In the command structure introduced by Hu and Shapley, for each player a simple game called
the command game is built. One of the central concepts of this model is the concept of command
function. We deliver sufficient and necessary conditions for a function to be a command function,
and describe the minimal sets generating a normal command game. We also study the relation
between command games and influence functions. A sufficient and necessary condition for the
equivalence between an influence function and a normal command game is delivered.
JEL Classification: C7, D7
Keywords: influence function, follower function, lower and upper inverses, kernel, com-
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1 Introduction
Success of every activity in life depends to a high degree on how well one can influence
others. The influence ability helps when creating a favorable impression on others about
ourselves and our achievements, e.g., when negotiating for grades, having a job interview,
implementing ideas in an organization, or making crucial economic and political decisions.
During the last three decades, the political economic literature has offered many
theoretical and empirical studies of political influence and power in groups (see e.g. [30] for
a short survey). Although many works on noncooperative models have characterized the
field of political economy, a cooperative approach to model influence and power in groups
has been applied as well and it is still of great interest. Since influence is present both in
noncooperative and cooperative environments, it should be studied by using tools of both
noncooperative and cooperative game theory. These two approaches are complementary
to each other when studying influence, and hence none of them should be ignored, but
they should be rather compared to each other. Applying both the noncooperative and
cooperative approaches can give a real picture of what is going on in the world based on
interaction between people, and can better explain the influence phenomenon. Starting
with a lack of cooperation, one might be better off by switching to a cooperative attitude.
⋆ Corresponding author
One of the natural phenomena related to influence and interaction among agents is
obviously the concept of leadership. According to power and influence theory of leader-
ship, this concept is based on the form of relationships between people rather than on
the abilities of a single person. In [4], the set of outcomes sustainable by a leader with
the power to make suggestions in games is examined. These suggestions are important
even if players can communicate and form coalitions. The author considers both finite-
horizon games and infinite-horizon two-player repeated games. In order to understand
how power, influence, and leadership are related to various facets of organizational life at
the individual, group and macro levels, network formation is usually applied. The liter-
ature on network formation has been growing up very fast for the last decade (see, e.g.,
[20, 19, 2]). Many noncooperative models of network formation have been investigated
(see, e.g., [1]), but also a cooperative approach to networks has been applied (see, e.g.,
[18]). In [21] the authors propose a graphical representation for noncooperative games
called multi-agent influence diagrams (MAIDs), which represent decision problems in-
volving multiple agents. One also needs to mention the use of social networks in studying
influence, because, as mentioned in [13], individual decisions and strategic interaction are
both embedded in a social network. In [24], for instance, the author stresses the fact that
decisions of individuals are often influenced by the decisions of other individuals. She
considers a network of interacting agents whose actions are determined by the actions of
their neighbors, according to a diffusion rule.
Another approach to modeling players’ interactions by the use of a social network
has been proposed in [12]. In this model, each player is assumed to have an inclination
to say either YES or NO which, due to influence by other voters, may be different from
the decision of the player. The influence model introduced in [12] is broader than voting
models, because in the influence model the analysis begins not in voting itself, but ‘one
step earlier’, that is, in the framework of original inclinations of voters. Influence by
other players in this model means that a player’s vote (decision) is different from his
original inclination. Formally, the influence is expressed by an influence function, which
assigns to each inclination vector (i.e., a vector describing the inclinations of all players)
a decision vector (i.e., a vector indicating the decisions of the players). The approach
based on influence functions is not cooperative in essence, since it does not involve any
notion of game in the cooperative sense. Rather, since influence is a dynamical concept
which leads to some equilibrium (final decision after several steps of influence), it has a
noncooperative flavor. One of the tools that describes the influence function is the concept
of a follower of a given coalition under a given influence function, that is, a voter who
always follows the inclination of the coalition in question. Formally, a follower function,
which assigns to each coalition the set of its followers, is defined. This influence model
is studied e.g. in [10] where, in particular, we introduce weighted influence indices, and
consider different influence functions.
Since influence among players is one of the natural phenomena that may appear in
particular in voting situations, modeling interaction among voters via voting games has
been also presented in the literature. Among concepts related to this topic it is worth
mentioning the notion of influence relation in simple games, which was introduced fifty
years ago in [17], to qualitatively compare the a priori influence of voters in a simple game.
As defined in [17], in a simple game, where players can vote either YES or NO, voter k is
said to be at least as influential as voter j, if whenever j can transform a losing coalition
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into a majority by joining it, voter k can achieve the same ceteris paribus. Very recently,
in [29] the influence relation has been extended to voting games with abstention. The
concept of interaction among players in a cooperative game is also studied, for instance,
in [8], where players in a coalition are said to exhibit a positive (negative) interaction
when the worth of the coalition is greater (smaller) than the sum of the individual worths.
Another interesting model related to the topic in question has been recently presented
in [15, 16], where the command structure of [28] is applied to model players’ interaction
relations by simple games. This approach is typically of cooperative nature. For each
player, boss sets and approval sets are introduced, and based on these sets, a simple
game called the command game for a player is built. Given a set of command games, the
command function is defined, which assigns to each coalition the set of all players that are
‘commandable’ by that coalition. In [9] we compare the framework of command games
with the influence model. In particular, we define several influence functions which capture
the command structure. These functions are compatible with the command games, in the
sense that each commandable player for a coalition in the command game is a follower
of the coalition under the command influence function. Some of the presented influence
functions are equivalent to the command games: An influence function and a command
game are said to be equivalent if the follower function of this influence function is identical
to the command function in this command game. For some influence functions we define
the equivalent command games. Moreover, we show that not for all influence functions
the compatible command games exist.
Although both cooperative and noncooperative approaches to power and influence
have been presented in the economic literature, research on the relations between these
two approaches has not been conducted frequently so far. The exception in the field of
voting power can be found, e.g., in [22], where a noncooperative interpretation of power
indices has been provided. The authors model noncooperative bargaining processes and
show how the power indices (i.e. the Shapley-Shubik index) can be interpreted as measures
of bargaining power that appear as limit cases (see also [23] for cooperative bargaining
foundation of this index).
Our aim is to model influence in a broad sense, by studying both the noncooperative
and cooperative approaches to influence in groups and, in particular, by determining links
between these two approaches. An advantage of our influence framework is its generality
which allows to cover many different situations. This is due to the influence function which
can be defined arbitrarily. On the one hand, our model covers noncooperative aspects,
when an individual tries to change the opinion of other agents and makes them decide
differently from their preliminary plans in order to end up in the individual’s preferable
outcome. On the other hand, the model has also cooperative features with individuals
who form coalitions and try to ‘win the game’ by cooperation.
In this paper we continue our work on influence presented in [9, 10]. While in the
two previous papers on influence we focus on concrete examples, for instance, we define
several influence functions and study their properties, the aim of the present paper is to
establish exact relations between the key concepts of the influence model and the framework
of command games. To be more precise, the aims and main results of this paper are the
following:
– studying the exact relation between an influence function and a follower function - We
deliver sufficient and necessary conditions for a function to be the follower function of
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some influence function. Given a follower function, we find the smallest and greatest
influence functions, called the lower and upper inverses, that lead to this follower
function. Moreover, we describe the structure of the set of all influence functions that
lead to a given follower function. This structure happens to be a distributive lattice,
and we indicate how to compute it.
– studying the exact relation between a command game and a command function - We
deliver sufficient and necessary conditions for a function to be the command function
of some command game. Moreover, we describe the minimal sets (winning coalitions)
generating a normal command game.
– studying the exact relation between a command game and an influence function - A
sufficient and necessary condition for the equivalence between an influence function
and a normal command game is delivered. We calculate the kernel of an influence
function equivalent to a normal command game. Several examples that illustrate the
concepts studied and results obtained in this paper are presented.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present basic notations and defi-
nitions, related to partially ordered sets. Section 3 concerns the model of influence. We
recapitulate briefly the model, and study the relation between influence functions and
followers functions. In Section 4, the relation between a command game and a com-
mand function, and the relation between a command game and an influence function, are
studied. In Section 5, we give some concluding remarks, enhancing the most important
results of the paper. All the notions are illustrated by several examples. Long and tech-
nical proofs, as well as the technical material on partially ordered sets and lattices, are
put in the appendix.
2 Some notations and definitions
We give here some essential definitions and notations used in the paper. We begin by
giving some conventions for sets. We often omit braces for sets if no confusion occurs,
e.g., N \ {k}, S ∪{k} will be written N \ k, S ∪ k, etc. Set complementation will be often
denoted by a bar, i.e., S := N \ S, where N is the referential set, and S a subset of it.
Given a finite setN , we often deal in this paper with functions from 2N to 2N . Similarly
as we write for real-valued functions f ≤ g for f(x) ≤ g(x) for all x, we write for two
functions F,G : 2N → 2N that F ≤ G if F (S) ⊆ G(S) for all S ⊆ N .
If neither F ≤ G nor G ≤ F hold, F and G are said to be incomparable. As usual,
F = G means F (S) = G(S) for all S ⊆ N .
F : 2N → 2N is isotone or monotone nondecreasing if S ⊆ T ⊆ N implies F (S) ⊆
F (T ). If the first inclusion is reversed, then F is said to be antitone or monotone nonin-
creasing. A function is monotone if it is either isotone or antitone.
A partially ordered set (P,≤) or poset for short, is a set P endowed with a partial
order ≤, that is, a binary relation being reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive1. A lattice
L is a poset such that for any x, y ∈ L their least upper bound, denoted by x ∨ y, and
greatest lower bound x∧y always exist. (2N ,⊆) is an example of lattice (called Boolean),
as well as the set of functions from 2N → 2N , endowed with the above defined order.
1 We give here and after only the very minimum material for the understanding of the paper. We recommend
[3] for more details on posets and lattices.
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Generalizing the notion of interval, for two elements x, y ∈ P such that x ≤ y, we write
[x, y] := {z | x ≤ z ≤ y}. Also we write ]x, y] if x is excluded from the interval, similarly
for [x, y[. This notation will be often used in the sequel, for subsets and functions.
Given x ∈ P , a predecessor of x is any element y such that y ≤ x.
3 Influence functions and follower functions
3.1 The model of influence
The framework of influence that we study in this paper has been originally introduced
in [12], and next analyzed e.g. in [9–11, 25–27]. We consider a social network with the
set of players (agents, voters) denoted by N := {1, ..., n}. The players have to make a
certain acceptance/rejection decision. Each player has an inclination either to say YES
(denoted by +1) or NO (denoted by −1). An inclination vector i = (i1, ..., in) is an n-
vector consisting of ones and minus ones, and indicating the inclinations of all players.
Let I := {−1,+1}n be the set of all inclination vectors, and for any coalition S ⊆ N ,
|S| ≥ 1, let IS denote the set of all inclination vectors under which all members of S have
the same inclination, i.e.,
IS := {i ∈ I | ∀k, j ∈ S, ik = ij}.
For convenience, we denote (1, 1, . . . , 1) ∈ I by 1N , similarly for −1N , and also for mixed
cases like (1S,−1N\S). This last notation suggests to use the more compact notation S,
i.e., the set of YES voters, to denote the inclination vector (1S,−1N\S). This set notation
will be used most often in the paper.
It is assumed that players may influence each other, and due to the influences in the
network, the (final) decision of a player may be different from his (original) inclination. In
other words, each inclination vector i ∈ I is transformed into a decision vector Bi, where
B : I → I, i 7→ Bi is the influence function. The decision vector Bi = ((Bi)1, ..., (Bi)n)
is an n-vector consisting of ones and minus ones, and indicating the decisions made by
all players. The set of all influence functions is denoted by B. Using the set notation, if i
corresponds to S, we denote Bi by B(S), and B(S) ⊆ N is the set of voters whose (final)
decision is YES. Hence, an influence function can be seen as a mapping from 2N to 2N .
One of the main concepts of the influence model is the concept of a follower of a given
coalition, that is, a voter who ‘always’ follows the inclination of the coalition in question.
‘Always’ means here in all cases in which all members of the coalition have the same
inclination. Let B ∈ B. The follower function of B is a mapping FB : 2
N → 2N defined
as
FB(S) := {k ∈ N | ∀i ∈ IS, (Bi)k = iS}, ∀S ⊆ N, S 6= ∅,
and FB(∅) := ∅. FB(S) is the set of followers of S under B. In [10] it is shown that FB
is isotone, and FB(S) ∩ FB(T ) = ∅ whenever S ∩ T = ∅. The set of all follower functions
is denoted by F . In set notation, the definition of the follower function becomes:
FB(S) =
⋂
S′⊇S
B(S ′) ∩
⋂
S′⊆N\S
B(S ′), ∀S ⊆ N, S 6= ∅, (1)
and FB(∅) := ∅, as it can be checked.
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Assume FB is not identically the empty set. The kernel of B is the following collection
of sets:
K(B) := {S ∈ 2N | FB(S) 6= ∅, and S
′ ⊂ S ⇒ FB(S
′) = ∅}.
The kernel is well defined due to isotonicity of FB. It is the set of minimal coalitions
having followers, or put otherwise, the set of ‘truly’ influential coalitions.
Example 1. We apply the basic influence concepts to the Confucian model of society
mentioned in [16], and later analyzed in [9]. A four-member society is considered, i.e.,
N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, with the king (1), the man (2), the wife (3), and the child (4). Hence, the
set of all inclination vectors is I = {−1,+1}4, |I| = 16. The principles which the society
should follow in a decision-making process are the following:
(i) The man follows the king;
(ii) The wife and the child follow the man;
(iii) The king should respect his people.
The society with the rules mentioned above can be modeled as a 4-player social network
in which some players are influenced (or follow) the other players. The principles (i) and
(ii) are rather straightforward to define in terms of an influence function: a decision of
player 2 always coincides with the inclination of player 1, while players 3 and 4 always
decide according to the inclination of player 2. However, the rule (iii) can be interpreted
in different ways, depending, e.g., on features of the society, like its politics, culture,
tradition, history, etc. How can the king interpret the rule (iii) in a decision-making
process? Let us consider three different interpretations, denoted by (A), (B), and (C).
Figure 1 shows social networks for these three cases. An arc from player j to k means
that j influences player k, i.e., there is at least one inclination vector under which player
k decides according to the inclination of j, although these two players in question were
inclined differently from each other.
3 2 4
1(A)
3 2 4
1(B)&(C)
Fig. 1. Social networks for the Confucian model
(A) King follows only himself - In such a society, the king always decides according to his
own inclination. Figure 1(A) illustrates this case: the king is never influenced by his
people (no arcs going to player 1), but the man is influenced by the king (an arc from
player 1 to player 2), and the man influences both his wife and his child (arcs going
from player 2 to players 3 and 4). Such a network also models a situation in which
the king simply ignores the rule (iii).
(B) King follows only unanimous people - The rule (iii) means for the king to follow his
people only if they are all unanimous, otherwise the king decides according to his own
inclination. In this case, the king does not follow himself only in two cases when his
three people have an inclination different from his own inclination. Figure 1(B) shows
this case: there exists a certain influence of the people on the king (there are arcs
going from players 2, 3, and 4 to player 1), although this influence is quite limited.
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(C) King follows the majority of his people - In such a society, the king follows the majority
of his people, i.e., he decides according to the inclination of at least two players from
the set N \ {1}. Figure 1(C) illustrates this society. Although the network is the same
as in the previous case, the influence function is defined differently from the case (B).
Let the influence functions of the cases (A), (B), and (C) be denoted by B, B′, and B′′,
respectively. The following table presents these influence functions, both in the vector
and set notations.
i ∈ I S ⊆ N Bi B(S) B′i B′(S) B′′i B′′(S)
(1, 1, 1, 1) N (1, 1, 1, 1) N (1, 1, 1, 1) N (1, 1, 1, 1) N
(1, 1, 1,−1) 123 (1, 1, 1, 1) N (1, 1, 1, 1) N (1, 1, 1, 1) N
(1, 1,−1, 1) 124 (1, 1, 1, 1) N (1, 1, 1, 1) N (1, 1, 1, 1) N
(1,−1, 1, 1) 134 (1, 1,−1,−1) 12 (1, 1,−1,−1) 12 (1, 1,−1,−1) 12
(−1, 1, 1, 1) 234 (−1,−1, 1, 1) 34 (1,−1, 1, 1) 134 (1,−1, 1, 1) 134
(1,−1, 1,−1) 13 (1, 1,−1,−1) 12 (1, 1,−1,−1) 12 (−1, 1,−1,−1) 2
(1, 1,−1,−1) 12 (1, 1, 1, 1) N (1, 1, 1, 1) N (−1, 1, 1, 1) 234
(−1, 1, 1,−1) 23 (−1,−1, 1, 1) 34 (−1,−1, 1, 1) 34 (1,−1, 1, 1) 134
(1,−1,−1, 1) 14 (1, 1,−1,−1) 12 (1, 1,−1,−1) 12 (−1, 1,−1,−1) 2
(−1,−1, 1, 1) 34 (−1,−1,−1,−1) ∅ (−1,−1,−1,−1) ∅ (1,−1,−1,−1) 1
(−1, 1,−1, 1) 24 (−1,−1, 1, 1) 34 (−1,−1, 1, 1) 34 (1,−1, 1, 1) 134
(1,−1,−1,−1) 1 (1, 1,−1,−1) 12 (−1, 1,−1,−1) 2 (−1, 1,−1,−1) 2
(−1, 1,−1,−1) 2 (−1,−1, 1, 1) 34 (−1,−1, 1, 1) 34 (−1,−1, 1, 1) 34
(−1,−1, 1,−1) 3 (−1,−1,−1,−1) ∅ (−1,−1,−1,−1) ∅ (−1,−1,−1,−1) ∅
(−1,−1,−1, 1) 4 (−1,−1,−1,−1) ∅ (−1,−1,−1,−1) ∅ (−1,−1,−1,−1) ∅
(−1,−1,−1,−1) ∅ (−1,−1,−1,−1) ∅ (−1,−1,−1,−1) ∅ (−1,−1,−1,−1) ∅
The sets of followers of each coalition under the three influence functions are as follows:
S ∅ 1 2 3 4 12 13 14
FB(S) ∅ 12 34 ∅ ∅ N 12 12
FB′(S) ∅ 2 34 ∅ ∅ N 12 12
FB′′(S) ∅ 2 34 ∅ ∅ 234 2 2
S 23 24 34 123 124 134 234 N
FB(S) 34 34 ∅ N N 12 34 N
FB′(S) 34 34 ∅ N N 12 134 N
FB′′(S) 134 134 1 N N 12 134 N
We can see from this table that the follower functions FB, F
′
B and F
′′
B are indeed
isotone, and for any two disjoint coalitions, the sets of followers of these coalitions under
B, B′ and B′′ are also disjoint. Moreover, the kernel of each influence function is equal
to K(B) = K(B′) = K(B′′) = {{1}, {2}}.
3.2 The mapping Φ
We want to establish the exact relation between two key concepts of the influence model:
the influence function, and the follower function. We have seen that an influence function
B can be considered as a mapping from 2N to 2N , exactly like follower functions. The
cardinality of the set of such mappings is (2n)(2
n) = 2n2
n
, and there are potentially as
many influence functions as follower functions. However, while there is no restriction onB,
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FB should satisfy some conditions, like isotonicity. Hence, there are functions in (2
N)(2
N )
which cannot be the follower function of some influence function, and consequently, several
B’s may have the same follower function. Put differently, we loose some information by
considering only FB. Formally, this means that the mapping Φ : B → (2
N)(2
N ) defined by
B 7→ Φ(B) := FB
is neither a surjection nor an injection. We have Φ(B) =: F .
The following natural questions may be raised:
(1) Given a function F : 2N → 2N , which are the sufficient and necessary conditions so
that there exists B ∈ B such that F is the follower function of B, i.e., F = FB?
(2) If F : 2N → 2N is indeed a follower function, can we easily find examples of B’s such
that FB = F ?
(3) Moreover, can we find Φ−1(F ), i.e., the set of all influence functions that lead to the
follower function F ? What is the (algebraic) structure of Φ−1(F )?
The results shown in this subsection answers the first and second questions, and Subsec-
tion 3.3 totally solves the third question.
Proposition 1. A function F : 2N → 2N is a follower function of some B ∈ B (i.e.,
FB = F , or Φ(B) = F ) if and only if it satisfies the following three conditions:
(i) F (∅) = ∅;
(ii) F is isotone;
(iii) If S ∩ T = ∅, then F (S) ∩ F (T ) = ∅.
Moreover, the smallest and greatest influence functions belonging to Φ−1(F ) are respec-
tively the influence functions BF and BF , defined by, in set notation:
BF (S) = F (S), BF (S) = F (S), ∀S ⊆ N. (2)
We call these influence functions the lower and upper inverses of F .
(see proof in appendix)
Corollary 1. The function Φ satisfies the following properties:
(i) For any B ∈ B, Φ(B) ≤ B.
(ii) The set of fixed points of Φ (i.e., for which Φ(B) = B) is exactly F . Hence, Φ2 =
Φ3 = · · · = Φ.
Proof: (i) Denoting F := Φ(B), by definition B ≥ BF = F = Φ(B) by (2).
(ii) If B ∈ F , then B ∈ Φ−1(B), hence Φ(B) = B. Conversely, suppose that B 6∈ F
and Φ(B) = B. But then B ∈ F , a contradiction. The last affirmation follows from
Φ(B) = F . 
Example 2. Consider F (S) = ∅, for all S ⊆ N , which is a follower function. We already
know from [10, Prop. 7] that an inverse of F by Φ is the reversal function −Id, defined by
(−Id)i := −i, for each i ∈ I. Clearly, the lower inverse is the constant function B ≡ −1N ,
while the upper inverse is B ≡ 1N .
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Example 3. Consider F = Id, which is a follower function. We know already from [10,
Prop. 6] that an inverse of F is the identity function Id. Clearly, the lower and upper
inverses collapse to Id. Hence, Φ−1(Id) = {Id}.
Example 4. Let n = 3 and the following function F be defined as follows:
S ∅ 1 2 3 12 13 23 123
F (S) ∅ ∅ 2 ∅ 2 3 12 123
One can check that it is indeed a follower function. The upper and lower inverses are:
i ∅ 1 2 3 12 13 23 123
BF i ∅ 3 12 13 123 13 123 123
BF i ∅ ∅ 2 ∅ 2 3 12 123
3.3 Structure of Φ−1(F )
We know that all elements of the inverse of F are between BF and BF , with the usual
order ≤ on functions. Then (Φ−1(F ),≤) is a poset, which is a subset of ([BF , BF ],≤).
We write for simplicity
DS := BF (S) \BF (S), S ⊆ N.
Hence, an element of [BF , BF ] is more easily denoted by the 2
n-dim vector (T∅, . . . , TN ),
where TS ⊆ DS for each S ⊆ N . With this notation, BF and BF are denoted by (∅, . . . , ∅)
and (D∅, . . . , DN) respectively, and BF in Example 4 is (∅, 3, 1, 13, 13, 1, 3, ∅).
We begin by a simple but fundamental observation.
Remark 1. Let F ∈ F . For any S ⊆ N , we have DS = DS. Indeed, since F (S)∩F (S) = ∅
by Proposition 1 (iii),
DS = B(S) \B(S) = F (S) \ F (S) = F (S) \ F (S) = B(S) \B(S) = DS.
Due to this, TS and TS neither intersect F (S) nor F (S) (see Figure 2).
F (S)
F (S)
T
S
TS
DS = DS
Fig. 2. Set relations between F (S) and TS
The next proposition will be useful in the sequel (see proof in Appendix).
Proposition 2. Let B := (T∅, . . . , TN) 6= BF be an element of Φ
−1(F ). Then for any
S ⊆ N such that DS \ TS 6= ∅, and any k ∈ DS \ TS, B
′ := (T∅, . . . , TS ∪ {k}, . . . , TN ) is
an element of Φ−1(F ) if and only if one of the following conditions is not satisfied:
(i) For any S ′ ⊃ S, k ∈ B(S ′)
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(ii) For any S ′ ⊆ N \ S, k 6∈ B(S ′).
We give now the main result of this section, fully describing the structure of Φ−1(F ).
Theorem 1. For any F ∈ F , the set Φ−1(F ), endowed with the usual ordering of func-
tions, has the following properties:
(i) The greatest and least elements are BF and BF = F .
(ii) It is a lattice, with supremum and infimum given by, for any S ∈ 2N :
(B ∨ B′)(S) := B(S) ∪ B′(S)
(B ∧ B′)(S) := B(S) ∩ B′(S)
(iii) Φ−1(F ) is autodual, i.e., (Φ−1(F ),≤) and (Φ−1(F ),≥) are isomorphic. The duality is
expressed as follows: to each element B := (T∅, . . . , TS, . . . , TN) of Φ
−1(F ) corresponds
the element B′ := (DN \ TN , . . . , DS \ TS, . . . , D∅ \ T∅).
(iv) There are
∑
S⊆N |DS| join-irreducible elements
2, one for each k ∈ DS, S ⊆ N , either
of the form (kS∅) if this element belongs to Φ
−1(F ), otherwise of the form (kSkS∅),
where the notation (kS∅) is a shorthand for (∅, . . . , ∅, k, ∅, . . . , ∅), where k is at position
S, and similarly for (kSkS∅).
(v) The lattice is distributive and its height3 is h =
∑
S⊆N |DS|.
(see proof in Appendix) We comment about (iv), which is the keypoint of the result. From
lattice theory, we know that when the lattice is distributive, it is enough to know its join-
irreducible elements, which play a role similar to the basis of a vector space. Specifically,
any element of the lattice can be written in a unique way as an (irredundant) supremum
of join-irreducible elements. Moreover, we can generate all elements of the lattice as
follows. Denote by J the set of its join-irreducible elements, and endow it with the same
order relation ≤. Consider an antichain A of J , that is, a subset of J such that any
two elements B,B′ of A are incomparable (i.e., neither B ≤ B′ nor B′ ≤ B hold). Then
B :=
∨
B′∈AB
′ is an element of the lattice Φ−1(F ), and generating the entire lattice
amounts to generating all antichains of J .
Concerning (iv) again, checking whether (kS∅) is an element of Φ
−1(F ) is done by
using Proposition 2 with (T∅, . . . , TN) = (∅, . . . , ∅), i.e., it amounts to check if one of the
two following conditions fails:
(i) ∀S ′ ⊃ S, k ∈ F (S ′)
(ii) ∀S ′ ⊆ N \ S, k 6∈ F (S ′).
Note that if (kS∅) is not an element of Φ
−1(F ), then necessarily (kS∅) is.
Example 5. (Example 4 continued) Let us compute the join-irreducible elements of Φ−1(F ),
with F given in Example 4. The sets DS are as follows.
S ∅ 1 2 3 12 13 23 123
DS ∅ 3 1 13 13 1 3 ∅
2 A join-irreducible element of a lattice covers only one element, where x “covers” y means x > y and there is
no z such that x > z > y.
3 A lattice is distributive if ∨,∧ obey distributivity. The height of a lattice is the length of a longest path from
the least to the greatest element. It is a classical result that for a distributive lattice, its height is the number
of join-irreducible elements.
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The set J of join-irreducible elements contains 8 elements, given by:
– For S = 1, k = 3: (31∅) belongs to Φ
−1(F ), so it is a join-irreducible element.
– For S = 2, k = 1: (12∅) belongs to Φ
−1(F ), so it is a join-irreducible element.
– For S = 3, k = 1: (13∅) belongs to Φ
−1(F ), so it is a join-irreducible element.
– For S = 3, k = 3: (33∅) belongs to Φ
−1(F ), so it is a join-irreducible element.
– For S = 12, k = 1: (112∅) does not belong to Φ
−1(F ), so (11213∅) is a join-irreducible
element.
– For S = 12, k = 3: (312∅) does not belong to Φ
−1(F ), so (31233∅) is a join-irreducible
element.
– For S = 13, k = 1: (113∅) does not belong to Φ
−1(F ), so (11312∅) is a join-irreducible
element.
– For S = 23, k = 3: (323∅) does not belong to Φ
−1(F ), so (32331∅) is a join-irreducible
element.
¿From this we can generate all elements of Φ−1(F ). For example, {(11213∅), (31∅), (12∅)}
is an antichain of J , therefore (311213112) = (∅, 3, 1, 1, 1, ∅, ∅, ∅) is an element of Φ
−1(F ).
4 Command games, command functions, and influence
functions
4.1 The command games
We recapitulate briefly the main concepts of the command games introduced by [15, 16].
Let N = {1, ..., n} be the set of players (voters). For k ∈ N and S ⊆ N \ k:
– S is a boss set for k if S determines the choice of k;
– S is an approval set for k if k can act with an approval of S.
It is assumed that no subset can be both a boss set and an approval set, and that any
superset (in N \ k) of a boss set (resp. of an approval set) is a boss set (resp. an approval
set, provided it is not a boss set). Also, it is assumed that the empty set cannot be a boss
set because this does not make sense, but the empty set can be an approval set (which
means that player k can act alone). To avoid triviality, it is assumed that both families
of boss sets and approval sets cannot be empty.
For each k ∈ N , a simple game (N,Wk) is built, called the command game for k,
where the set of winning coalitions is
Wk := {S | S is a boss set for k} ∪ {S ∪ k | S is a boss or approval set for k}. (3)
Note that due to the above assumptions, this family is never empty and always contains
N . We call for brevity command game the set {(N,Wk), k ∈ N} of command games for
each player. We can recover the boss sets for k by
Bossk = {S ⊆ N \ k | S ∈ Wk} =Wk ∩ 2
N\k,
and the approval sets for k by
Appk = {S ⊆ N \ k | S ∪ k ∈ Wk but S /∈ Wk}.
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Moreover, we consider the minimal boss sets and the minimal approval sets for k
Boss∗k := {S ∈ Bossk | S
′ ⊂ S ⇒ S ′ /∈ Bossk}
App∗k := {S ∈ Appk | S
′ ⊂ S ⇒ S ′ /∈ Appk}.
Given a command game {(N,Wk), k ∈ N}, the command function ω : 2
N → 2N is defined
as
ω(S) := {k ∈ N | S ∈ Wk}, ∀S ⊆ N. (4)
ω(S) is the set of all members that are ‘commandable’ by S. In [15] it is shown that
ω(∅) = ∅, ω(N) = N , and ω(S) ⊆ ω(S ′) whenever S ⊂ S ′.
4.2 Relation between command games and influence functions
Since the framework of command games and our framework of influence functions address
the same problem, a natural question is: what is the relation between the two? We first
analyze the former, which will lead us to the natural notion of normal command game.
Let us first give an alternative more compact notation for command games, which
will make them closer to influence and follower functions. Indeed, a command game
{(N,Wk), k ∈ N} can be expressed by its characteristic function Ω : N × 2
N → {0, 1},
with
(k, S) 7→ Ω(k, S) =
{
1, if S ∈ Wk
0, otherwise.
The set of such functions is 2N×2
N
, hence its cardinality is 2n2
n
, which is exactly the
cardinality of B. Moreover, command functions are mappings from 2N to 2N , with again
the same cardinality 2n2
n
. There exists an obvious bijection between 2N×2
N
and (2N)(2
N ),
let us call it Ψ , defined by
Ψ (Ω) = ω, with ω(S) := {k ∈ N | Ω(k, S) = 1}, ∀S ⊆ N
Ψ−1(ω) = Ω, with Ω(k, S) = 1 iff k ∈ ω(S). (5)
Hence, ω and Ω are equivalent representations of a command game.
Now, it is obvious from Section 4.1 that any mapping Ω cannot correspond to a
command game, because the definition of boss and approval sets induce some structure
on the sets Wk. Indeed, if S
∗ is a minimal boss set, then any superset of S∗ is also a boss
set. Denoting by ↑S∗ the set of supersets of S∗, we have that Bossk =
⋃
S∗∈Boss∗
k
↑S∗, and
the same reasoning can be done for approval sets. In summary, by virtue of (3) we find
that
Wk =↑S1 ∪ . . .∪ ↑Sl (6)
where either Sj does not contain k (Sj is a minimal boss set for k), or Sj contains k (in
this case, Sj \ k is a minimal approval sets for k).
An important remark is the following. Suppose that S1, S2 in (6) are disjoint. Then it
may be the case that S1 votes YES and S2 votes NO, which would lead to a conflict for
k. Therefore, it is necessary to impose S1 ∩ · · · ∩ Sl 6= ∅. Lastly, recall that the empty set
cannot be a boss set, hence Wk 6=↑∅ = 2
N .
We summarize our findings in the next definition.
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Definition 1. A normal command game Ω is a set of simple games {(N,Wk), k ∈ N}
satisfying the two conditions:
(i) For each k ∈ N , there exists a minimal nonempty family of nonempty subsets Sk1 , . . . , S
k
lk
(called the generating family of Wk) such that Wk =↑S
k
1 ∪ . . .∪ ↑S
k
lk
.
(ii) For each k ∈ N , Sk1 ∩ · · · ∩ S
k
lk
6= ∅.
We denote by G the set of all normal command games (viewed as a subset of 2N×2
N
).
¿From this definition, we are able to tell whether a given function ω from 2N to 2N is
indeed a command function of some command game.
Proposition 3. Let ω ∈ (2N)(2
N ). Then ω corresponds to some normal command game,
i.e., ω ∈ Ψ (G), if and only if the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) ω(∅) = ∅, ω(N) = N ;
(ii) ω is isotone, i.e. it is monotone w.r.t. set inclusion;
(iii) If S ∩ S ′ = ∅, then ω(S) ∩ ω(S ′) = ∅.
(see proof in Appendix) Observe how close to the characterization of influence functions
the result is (see Proposition 1).
Suppose that ω ∈ Ψ (G), i.e., it satisfies the conditions of Proposition 3. Then the
(unique) corresponding command game {(N,Wk), k ∈ N} can be easily determined
through its generating families {Sk1 , . . . , S
k
lk
} of Wk as follows:
{Sk1 , . . . , S
k
lk
} = {S ∈ 2N | ω(S) ∋ k and S ′ ⊂ S ⇒ ω(S ′) 6∋ k}. (7)
Lastly, for any ω ∈ Ψ (G), the notion of kernel of ω, denoted by K(ω), is meaningful. It is
the collection of minimal coalitions commanding at least one player:
K(ω) := {S ∈ 2N | ω(S) 6= ∅, and S ′ ⊂ S ⇒ ω(S ′) = ∅}.
The structure of command games being explicited, we are in position to establish the
relation between command games and influence functions. Since command functions and
follower functions convey a similar meaning, the following definition is natural.
Definition 2. Let B be an influence function and Ω be a command game. Then B and
Ω are equivalent if FB = ω.
Due to the previous results, equivalence between influence functions and command
games is elucidated, and constitutes the main result of Section 4.
Theorem 2. (i) Let B be an influence function. Then there exists a unique normal com-
mand game Ω equivalent to B if and only if FB(N) = N . The generating families
{Sk1 , . . . , S
k
lk
}, k ∈ N , of Ω are given by (7), taking ω := FB. The minimal boss sets
and minimal approval sets are:
Boss∗k = {S
k
j | S
k
j 6∋ k, j = 1, . . . , lk}, App
∗
k = {S
k
j \ k | S
k
j ∋ k, j = 1, . . . , lk}.
(ii) Let Ω be a normal command game. Then any influence function in Φ−1(ω) is equiv-
alent to Ω, in particular the upper inverse Bω and the lower inverse Bω. Moreover,
the kernel of any influence function B in Φ−1(ω) is given by
K(B) = min
( ⋃
k∈N
{Sk1 , . . . , S
k
lk
}
)
= K(ω)
where min(. . .) means that only minimal sets are selected from the collection.
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4.3 Examples
In order to illustrate the concepts and results presented in this section, we recall two
examples of command games mentioned in [16]. According to Definition 1, both are
normal command games.
Example 6. Let us analyze the following command game:
N = {1, 2, 3}, W1 = {12, 13, 23, 123}, W2 = {12, 23, 123}, W3 = {23, 123}.
The command function is:
ω(1) = ω(2) = ω(3) = ∅, ω(12) = {1, 2}, ω(13) = {1}, ω(23) = N, ω(N) = N
K(ω) = {12, 13, 23}.
We can apply (7) and Theorem 2 to this game, which gives
{S11 , . . . , S
1
l1
} = {12, 13, 23}, {S21 , . . . , S
2
l2
} = {12, 23}, {S31 , . . . , S
3
l3
} = {23}
Boss∗1 = Boss1 = {23}, Boss
∗
k = Bossk = ∅, for k = 2, 3
App∗1 = App1 = {2, 3}, App
∗
2 = {1, 3}, App2 = {1, 3, 13} App
∗
3 = {2}, App3 = {2, 12}.
It can be checked that the same result is obtained from the families of winning coalitions
W1, W2, and W3. The upper and lower inverses of ω are
S ∅ 1 2 3 12 13 23 N
Bω(S) ∅ ∅ 23 3 N N N N
Bω(S) ∅ ∅ ∅ ∅ 12 1 N N
We have, of course, FB = ω, FB = ω, and
K(B) = K(B) = {12, 13, 23} = min
( ⋃
k∈{1,2,3}
{Sk1 , . . . , S
k
lk
}
)
.
Example 7. We turn to the Confucian model of society originally mentioned in [15] and
presented in Example 1 (see Section 3.1). In [9] we have studied several versions of this
model with different W1. We assume now that
N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, W1 = {1234}, W2 = {1, 12, 13, 14, 123, 124, 134, 1234}
W3 =W4 = {2, 12, 23, 24, 123, 124, 234, 1234}.
We have therefore
ω(1) = ω(13) = ω(14) = ω(134) = {2}, ω(2) = ω(23) = ω(24) = ω(234) = {3, 4}
ω(3) = ω(4) = ω(34) = ∅, ω(12) = ω(123) = ω(124) = {2, 3, 4}, ω(N) = N
K(ω) = {{1}, {2}}.
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Let us apply (7) to this game. We obtain
{S11 , . . . , S
1
l1
} = {1234}, {S21 , . . . , S
2
l2
} = {1}
{S31 , . . . , S
3
l3
} = {S41 , . . . , S
4
l4
} = {2}.
We can also apply Theorem 2 to this game:
Boss∗1 = Boss1 = ∅, App
∗
1 = App1 = {234}
Boss∗2 = {1}, Boss2 = {1, 13, 14, 134}
Boss∗3 = Boss
∗
4 = {2}, Boss3 = {2, 12, 24, 124}, Boss4 = {2, 12, 23, 123}
Appk = App
∗
k = ∅ for k = 2, 3, 4.
The upper and lower inverses of ω are
S ∅ 1 2 3 4 12 13 14
Bω(S) ∅ 12 134 1 1 N 12 12
Bω(S) ∅ 2 34 ∅ ∅ 234 2 2
S 23 24 34 123 124 134 234 N
Bω(S) 134 134 1 N N 12 134 N
Bω(S) 34 34 ∅ 234 234 2 34 N
We have, FB = ω, FB = ω, and
K(B) = K(B) = {{1}, {2}} = min
( ⋃
k∈{1,2,3,4}
{Sk1 , . . . , S
k
lk
}
)
.
Note that none of the influence functions B, B′ and B′′ defined in Example 1 is equivalent
to this command game with W1 = {1234}, since FB 6= ω, FB′ 6= ω, and FB′′ 6= ω. For
instance, FB(134) = FB′(134) = FB′′(134) = {1, 2} 6= {2} = ω(134).
5 Summary of results and concluding remarks
We have tried in this paper to make clear the relationship between two different frame-
works for the modeling of influence, namely influence functions and command games. We
think useful to emphasize some results and points raised in the paper:
– The notion of equivalence between a command game and an influence function (see
Definition 2) is the key notion permitting to compare the two frameworks, and this
notion is naturally dictated by the definitions of follower and command functions.
Moreover, the notion of equivalence permits also to clarify the operational meaning of
command games. Indeed, in the framework of Hu and Shapley, it is not clearly stated,
once the winning coalitions, boss sets and approval sets are fixed, what finally the
players will decide in a given voting situation. The link we propose through the follower
function permits to know all possible decision vectors from a given inclination vector.
Specifically, given a command game Ω, we compute ω = Ψ (Ω), then considering ω
as a follower function, we compute Φ−1(ω), which is the set of all possible influence
functions equivalent to Ω. From a given inclination vector i, the set of all possible
decision vectors under the command game Ω is {Bi | B ∈ Φ−1(Ψ (Ω))}.
15
– The framework of influence functions is more general than the framework of com-
mand games in two aspects. Theorem 2 shows clearly that, firstly, there are influence
functions not representable by a normal command game (these are all B’s such that
FB(N) 6= N), and secondly, to each normal command game, it corresponds in general
several influence functions which are equivalent to the command game.
– On the other hand, the framework of command games brings an interesting interpre-
tation of the framework of influence functions. The generality of influence functions
has to be paid by a relative opacity of its meaning. Given an influence function B,
it is hard to directly guess what are the influential players, and what is the exact
mechanism of influence implemented by B. Provided an equivalent command game
exists, Theorem 2 (i) brings a nice interpretation of an influence function through
(minimal) boss sets and approval sets. One should note also that boss and approval
sets are closely linked to the notion of kernel (of an influence function or a command
function).
Figure 3 tries to make clear the above points.
influence functions
command games
B F
F (N) = N
G
Φ
Φ−1
F
Φ−1(F )
Ψ
generating families,
boss and approval sets
equivalence
Fig. 3. Relations between influence functions and command games
The results presented in this paper establish a basis on which further research can
be undertaken. For instance, a generalized model of influence, in which each player has
a continuum of actions, should be investigated. The main aim of this research line is to
continue our work on the influence model with an ordered set of possible actions (see
[11]). Such an extension of the influence model is related to some works on abstention
that have already been presented in the literature on voting (see, e.g. [5–7, 29]), and on
multi-choice games [14]. A research agenda concerning our future work on the influence
model contains also an introduction of dynamic aspects into the model and a study of
the behavior of the series of influence functions.
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A Proof of Proposition 1
We already know from [10, Prop. 2] that any follower function fulfills the above three
conditions. Take F : 2N → 2N satisfying the above conditions. Let us check if indeed
Φ(BF ) = Φ(F ) =: FF is equal to F . We have to prove that FF (S) = F (S) for every
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S ⊆ N . It is true for S = ∅, by definition of follower functions, and the condition
F (∅) = ∅. Assume S 6= ∅. Since F is isotone, we have F (S ′) ⊇ F (S) for all S ′ ⊇ S, which
implies
⋂
S′⊇S F (S
′) = F (S). By (iii), F (S ′) ∩ F (S) = ∅ for all S ′ ⊆ N \ S. Therefore,⋂
S′⊆N\S F (S
′) ⊇ F (S). From (1), we deduce then that FF (S) = F (S).
It remains to show that F is the smallest inverse of F . Assuming F 6= ∅, for any
S ⊆ N such that F (S) 6= ∅, k ∈ F (S) implies that for any B ∈ Φ−1(F ), B(S) contains
k. Therefore B(S) ⊇ F (S) for any S ⊆ N . The proof for the upper inverse is analogous.
B Proof of Proposition 2
We need first a technical lemma.
Lemma 1. Let B,B′ be identical influence functions except on S ⊆ N , where k 6∈ B(S),
and B′(S) = B(S) ∪ k. Assume that k is neither a follower of S in B′ nor a follower of
S in B (i.e., k 6∈ FB′(S), k 6∈ FB(S)). Then FB(S
′) = FB′(S
′), for all S ′ ⊆ N .
Proof: Since the only change between B and B′ is the addition of k to S, the only
change between FB and FB′ concerns k. Hence, we have to consider, for any S
′ ⊆ N ,
the occurrence of two situations: either (i) k is a follower of S ′ for B but no more for
B′, or (ii) k is not a follower of S ′ for B but it becomes for B′. First observe that the
case S ′ = S is done, hence we can discard it from the analysis. Indeed, k 6∈ FB′(S) by
hypothesis, and k ∈ FB(S) is impossible since k 6∈ B(S). Hence FB(S) = FB′(S).
(i) We consider that k ∈ FB(S
′) and k 6∈ FB′(S
′). Then for all S ′′ ⊇ S ′, we have
k ∈ B(S ′′), and for all S ′′ ⊆ N \ S ′, k 6∈ B(S ′′). Suppose that S ′ ⊃ S or S and S ′ are
incomparable with a nonempty intersection. Then S is neither a superset of S ′ nor a subset
of N \ S ′, which means that B and B′ are identical on (↑S ′) ∪ (↓ S ′). Then k ∈ FB′(S
′),
a contradiction. Suppose that S ′ ⊂ S. Since S is a superset of S ′, by hypothesis we have
k ∈ B(S), which contradicts the definition of B.
The remaining case is S ∩S ′ = ∅. Then any superset of S is a superset of S ′, and any
subset of N \ S = S is a subset of N \ S ′, which by hypothesis implies that k ∈ FB(S).
But this contradicts the assumption.
(ii) We consider that k 6∈ FB(S
′) and k ∈ FB′(S
′). Then for all S ′′ ⊇ S ′, we have
k ∈ B′(S ′′), and for all S ′′ ⊆ N \ S ′, k 6∈ B′(S ′′). Suppose that S ′ ⊃ S or S and S ′
are incomparable with a nonempty intersection. As said above, B and B′ are identical
on (↑ S ′) ∪ (↓ S ′). Then k ∈ FB(S
′), a contradiction. Suppose that S ′ ⊂ S. Then any
superset of S is a superset of S ′, and any subset of N \ S is a subset of N \ S ′, which by
hypothesis implies that k ∈ FB′(S), a contradiction with the assumption.
Finally, suppose that S ∩ S ′ = ∅. Since S is a subset of N \ S ′, we have k 6∈ B′(S),
which contradicts the definition of B′. 
Proof: (of Proposition 2) Before to show the equivalence, we remark that k ∈ DS \ TS
implies that k 6∈ F (S) and k 6∈ F (S) (by definition of BF , see Figure 2). Remember also
that F = FB.
Assume that the two conditions hold. Then k is a follower of S for B′, which implies
that B′ 6∈ Φ−1(F ). Assume on the contrary that one of the conditions is false. We have
to prove that FB′(S
′) = FB(S
′), for all S ′ ⊆ N . Consider first the case S ′ = S. Since the
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only change concerns k, changes of the followers for B and B′ can only concern k. Then
we have only one possibility: k is not a follower of S for B but it becomes for B′. Since
one of the conditions fails, k ∈ B′(S) is not sufficient to ensure that k ∈ FB′(S). Hence
k 6∈ FB′(S), and since k 6∈ FB(S), we are exactly in the conditions of Lemma 1, which
proves the equality of FB and FB′ . 
C Proof of Theorem 1
The proof relies on the following fundamental result.
Proposition 4. Let F ∈ F be given, and consider B := (T∅, . . . , TN) an element of
[BF , BF ]. Then B ∈ Φ
−1(F ) if and only if the following conditions are satisfied:
(i)
⋂
S∋i
TS \ TS = ∅, ∀i ∈ N (or equivalently
⋂
S′⊇S
TS′ \ TS′ = ∅, ∀S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅).
(ii)
⋂
S′∈C
F (S ′) ∩
⋂
S′′⊇S
S′′ 6⊇S′,∀S′∈C
TS′′ \ TS′′ = ∅, for any antichain C in ]S,N ].
Proof: We express FB(S) and see under which conditions the equality FB(S) = F (S)
holds for all S ⊆ N . Let us remark that the equality always holds for S = ∅.
Using (1), the definition of B, and Figure 2 we have, for any S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅,
FB(S) =
⋂
S′⊇S
(
F (S ′) ∪ TS′
)
∩
⋂
S′⊆N\S
(
F (S ′) ∩ TS′
)
=
⋂
S′⊇S
(
F (S ′) ∪ TS′
)
∩
⋂
S′⊇S
(
F (S ′) ∩ TS′
)
=
⋂
S′⊇S
[(
F (S ′) ∪ TS′
)
∩
(
F (S ′) ∩ TS′
)]
=
⋂
S′⊇S
[(
F (S ′) ∩ F (S ′) ∩ TS′︸ ︷︷ ︸
F (S′)
)
∪
(
TS′ ∩ F (S ′) ∩ TS′︸ ︷︷ ︸
T
S′
\T
S′
)]
=
⋂
S′⊇S
(
F (S ′) ∪ (TS′ \ TS′)
)
.
If S = N , then we obtain FB(N) = F (N) ∪ (TN \ T∅), which implies TN \ T∅ = ∅. This is
condition (i) for S = N . Since condition (ii) is void for S = N , we have proved the result
for S = N . Consider S 6= ∅, N . Applying distributivity of ∩ and ∪, we obtain:
FB(S) =
⋃
S⊆[S,N ]
( ⋂
S′∈S
F (S ′) ∩
⋂
S′∈[S,N ]\S
TS′ \ TS′
)
.
Let us process first the simple cases where S = ∅ and S = [S,N ]. In the first case, we get
only the term
⋂
S′⊇S TS′ \ TS′. In the second case, it remains only
⋂
S′⊇S F (S
′), which is
equal to F (S) by isotonicity of F .
We suppose now that S 6= ∅, [S,N ]. Suppose S ∋ S. Then by isotonicity of F we get⋂
S′∈SF (S
′) = F (S). Moreover, by Figure 2 and isotonicity of F again, we obtain that
F (S) ∩
⋂
S′∈[S,N ]\STS′ \ TS′ = ∅.
Suppose on the contrary that ∅ 6= S ∈]S,N ]. By isotonicity of F , if the family S
has a single minimal element, say S1 (i.e., S ⊆ [S1, N ] and S1 ∈ S), then
⋂
S′∈SF (S
′) =
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F (S1). Similarly, if the family S has two minimal elements, say S1, S2, then
⋂
S′∈SF (S
′) =
F (S1)∩F (S2), and so on. Let us consider all families S having as single minimal element
S1, and consider
⋂
S′∈[S,N ]\STS′ \ TS′. The largest set will be obtained for the smallest
family [S,N ] \ S, hence the largest S, which is [S1, N ]. Hence⋃
S⊆]S,N ]
minimal element=S1
(
(F (S1) ∩
⋂
S′∈[S,N ]\S
TS′ \ TS′
)
= F (S1) ∩
⋂
S′⊇S
S′ 6⊇S1
TS′ \ TS′ .
The reasoning easily extends to any number of minimal elements:⋃
S⊆]S,N ]
minimal elements=S1,S2
(
(F (S1)∩F (S2)∩
⋂
S′∈[S,N ]\S
TS′ \TS′
)
= F (S1)∩F (S2)∩
⋂
S′⊇S
S′ 6⊇S1,S2
TS′ \TS′
and so on. So we obtain in summary:
FB(S) = F (S)︸ ︷︷ ︸
S=[S,N ]
∪
( ⋂
S′⊇S
TS′ \ TS′︸ ︷︷ ︸
S=∅
)
∪
⋃
all antichains C in ]S,N ]T
S′∈C
F (S′)6=F (S)
( ⋂
S′∈C
F (S ′)∩
⋂
S′′⊇S
S′′ 6⊇S′,∀S′∈C
TS′′ \TS′′
)
.
To get this final expression, observe that the set of all possible configurations of minimal
elements of S coincides with the set of antichains of ]S,N ]. Finally, observe that for
any antichain C in ]S,N ], we have
⋂
S′∈CF (S
′) ⊇ F (S). If equality occurs, then the
intersection with any TS′ \ TS′ , S
′ ∈ [S,N ] is empty, by Figure 2 and isotonicity of F .
Then clearly, FB(S) = F (S) if and only if each term in parenthesis is the empty set.

Proof: (of Theorem 1) (i) is already known from Prop. 1.
Let us prove first (iii). Take B := (T∅, . . . , TS, . . . , TN ) of Φ
−1(F ). Then the two
conditions of Prop. 4 hold for all S ∈ 2N . We have to prove that they still hold for B′,
which amounts to replace in these two conditions TS′ \ TS′ by (DS′ \ TS′) \ (DS′ \ TS′).
But sinceDS′ = F (S ′)\F (S ′) = DS′, and by Figure 2, (DS′\TS′)\(DS′\TS′) = TS′\TS′ ,
which proves the result.
Let us prove (ii). Since Φ−1(F ) is a subset of a product of set lattices, the operations
∨,∧ defined above are clearly supremum and infimum. We just have to prove that B∨B′
and B ∧ B′ belong to Φ−1(F ) whenever B,B′ belong to Φ−1(F ), to prove that Φ−1 is a
lattice. Due to (iii), we only have to prove it for, e.g., the infimum.
Consider B := (T∅, . . . , TN) and B
′ = (T ′∅, . . . , T
′
N) in Φ
−1(F ). Then B ∧ B′ = (T∅ ∩
T ′∅, . . . , TN ∩ T
′
N). Using Proposition 4, we have to prove that the two conditions there
are satisfied. The first one reads
K :=
⋂
S′⊇S
(TS′ ∩ T
′
S′) \ (TS′ ∩ T
′
S′
) = ∅, ∀S ⊆ N, S 6= ∅.
From the general relation
(A ∩ A′) \ (B ∩ B′) =
(
(A \B) ∩ A′
)
∪
(
(A′ \B′) ∩ A
)
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we get
K =
⋂
S′⊇S
[(
(TS′ \ TS′) ∩ T
′
S′
)
∪
(
(T ′S′ \ T
′
S′
) ∩ TS′
)]
.
Applying distributivity we get
K =
⋃
S⊆[S,N ]
[ ⋂
S′∈S
(TS′ \ TS′) ∩ T
′
S′ ∩
⋂
S′∈[S,N ]\S
(T ′S′ \ T
′
S′
) ∩ TS′
]
=:
⋃
S⊆[S,N ]
KS.
Taking S = [S,N ] or ∅, KS = ∅, because by Proposition 4 we have⋂
S′∈[S,N ] TS′ \ TS′ = ∅, and the same for B
′. We consider then KS with ∅ 6= S ⊂ [S,N ].
Suppose that KS 6= ∅, and take any x ∈ KS. Then we deduce that
(a) x ∈ TS′ and x ∈ T
′
S′ for all S
′ ∈ [S,N ];
(b) x 6∈ TS′ for all S
′ ∈ S, and x 6∈ T ′
S′
for all S ′ ∈ [S,N ] \ S.
From (a), we easily deduce that for all S ′ ⊇ S and all S ′ ⊆ N \S, x 6∈ F (S ′). Indeed, from
(a), we know that x ∈ DS′, and so x 6∈ F (S
′) for all S ′ ∈ [S,N ]. Next, for any S ′ ⊆ N \S,
we have S ′ ∈ [S,N ]. Then x ∈ DS′ = DS′, which proves again that x 6∈ F (S
′).
¿From this we deduce that in particular x 6∈ F (N). Let us prove that x necessarily
belongs to either FB(N) or FB′(N), which causes F 6= FB or F 6= FB′ , a contradiction
with the hypothesis. This amounts to prove that x is a follower of N for B or B′. We
know by (a) that x ∈ TN and x ∈ T
′
N , which proves that x ∈ B(N) and B
′(N). By (b),
we deduce that x 6∈ T∅ (if N ∈ S) or x 6∈ T
′
∅ (if N 6∈ S). Since F (∅) = ∅, we deduce that
x 6∈ B(∅) or x 6∈ B′(∅). We turn to the second condition, which reads
K :=
⋂
S′∈C
F (S ′) ∩
⋂
S′∈SC
(TS′ ∩ T
′
S′) \ (TS′ ∩ T
′
S′
) = ∅,
for all antichain C ∈]S,N ], for all S ⊂ N , and SC := {S
′′ ⊇ S, S ′′ 6⊇ S ′, ∀S ′ ∈ C}.
Proceeding as above, we get after some manipulation
K =
⋃
S⊆SC
[ ⋂
S′∈C
F (S ′) ∩
⋂
S′∈S
(
(TS′ \ TS′) ∩ T
′
S′
)
∩
⋂
S′∈SC\S
(
(T ′S′ \ T
′
S′
) ∩ TS′
)]
=:
⋃
S⊆SC
KS.
We have to prove that KS = ∅, ∀S ⊆ SC. As above, taking S = SC or ∅ leads to KS = ∅ by
Proposition 4. We consider then ∅ 6= S ⊂ SC, and we assume that KS 6= ∅, and consider
x ∈ KS. This implies that x belongs to each term of the intersections in KS, hence
(c) x ∈ TS′ and x ∈ T
′
S′ for all S
′ ∈ SC;
(d) x 6∈ TS′ for all S
′ ∈ S, and x 6∈ T ′
S′
for all S ′ ∈ SC \ S;
(e) x ∈ F (S ′), ∀S ′ ∈ C.
Proceeding as above again, we deduce from (c) that
x 6∈ F (S ′) for all S ′ ∈ SC, and for all S
′ ⊆ N \ S such that S ′ ∈ SC. (8)
Consider S0, any maximal element of SC. An important fact is to notice that
∀S ′ ⊃ S0, ∃S
′′ ∈ C such that S ′ ⊇ S ′′. (9)
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Indeed, S ′ ⊃ S0 implies S
′ 6∈ SC. On the other hand, S
′ ⊆ N and S ′ ⊃ S0 ⊇ S implies
S ′ ∈ [S,N ]. So by definition of SC, S
′ ⊇ S ′′ for some S ′′ ∈ C.
Let us prove that x ∈ FB(S0) or FB′(S0). Since x 6∈ F (S0) by (8), this suffices to
give a contradiction, hence KS = ∅ for all S, which proves that the second condition is
fulfilled. For this, we have to prove:
– ∀S ′ ⊇ S0, B(S
′) ∋ x (or the same with B′). This is true for S ′ = S0 by (c). By
(9), S ′ ⊇ S ′′ for some S ′′ ∈ C. Since x ∈ F (S ′′) by assumption, x ∈ F (S ′) too by
isotonicity of F . Hence, x ∈ B(S ′), and also x ∈ B′(S ′).
– ∀S ′ ⊆ N \ S0, B(S
′) 6∋ x (or the same condition with B′). From (8) we know that
x 6∈ F (N \S0), hence x 6∈ F (S
′) for all S ′ ⊆ N \S0 by isotonicity of F . So it remains to
show that x 6∈ TS′ for all S
′ ⊆ N \ S0 (or the same with T
′
S′). By (d), we have x 6∈ TS0
or x 6∈ T ′
S0
(depending whether S0 ∈ S or not). Let us assume the case x 6∈ TS0 . By (e),
x ∈ F (S ′′) for all S ′′ ∈ C, and F = FB = FB′ . This implies that for all S
′′′ ⊆ N \ S ′′,
S ′′ ∈ C, x 6∈ TS′′′. It remains to prove that any S
′ ⊂ N \ S0 is necessarily a subset of
N \S ′′ for some S ′′ ∈ C. But this is equivalent to prove that any S ′ ⊃ S0 is a superset
of some S ′′ ∈ C, which is exactly (9).
The proof that B ∧ B′ belongs to Φ−1(F ) is complete. Now, since these infimum and
supremum are those of
∏
S⊆N
2DS , Φ−1(F ) is a sublattice of it.
(iv) and (v). First, since Φ−1(F ) is a sublattice of a distributive lattice, it is dis-
tributive. Hence, it is ranked and the length of any maximal chain from bottom to top
is the number of join-irreducible elements. Second, the height of the lattice is at most∑
S⊆N |DS| since one adds at least one new element k of some DS at each step, hence
this is the maximal number of join-irreducible elements.
We examine now what are the join-irreducible elements. Let us take S ⊆ N such that
DS 6= ∅, and any k ∈ DS. Evidently, (kS∅) covers only one element, the bottom of the
lattice. Hence it is a join-irreducible element provided it belongs to Φ−1(F ). Applying
Proposition 2, this amounts to show that at least one of the following conditions is false:
(i) ∀S ′ ⊃ S, k ∈ F (S ′)
(ii) ∀S ′ ⊆ N \ S, k 6∈ F (S ′).
If one of the conditions fails, then (kS∅) is a join-irreducible element. Suppose then that
both conditions hold. Then (kS∅) 6∈ Φ
−1(F ) because k becomes a follower of S. It suffices
to add k at some position S ′ with S ′ ⊆ N \ S, to prevent k from becoming a follower of
S. Observe that S ′ = N \ S is always a solution, because DS = DN\S, and so k ∈ DN\S .
Moreover, it is the only solution, since for any S ′ ⊂ N \ S, k 6∈ DS′ . Indeed, if k ∈ DS′ ,
then k ∈ DS′, which means that k 6∈ F (S
′). But S ′ is a proper superset of S, so this
contradicts assumption (i). Hence (kSkS∅) is an element of Φ
−1(F ). Lastly, we have to
show that (kSkS∅) covers only one element. Since by assumption (kS∅) is not an element
of Φ−1(F ), it can only cover, either (kS∅) or, if this element does not belong to Φ
−1(F ),
the bottom element. In both cases we are done, but observe that only the first case can
occur. Indeed, by hypothesis, (ii) holds, which makes fail (i) written for S instead of S.
Since doing so for all S ⊆ N and all k ∈ DS we have found
∑
S⊆N |DS| join-irreducible
elements, there cannot be more. 
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D Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose ω corresponds to some normal command game. Then ω(∅) = ∅ follows from the
fact that ∅ 6∈ Wk, ∀k ∈ N . On the other hand, ω(N) = N since N ∈ Wk, ∀k ∈ N . Next,
take S ⊆ S ′ ⊆ N . If k ∈ ω(S), then k ∈ ω(S ′) too due to the definition of Wk, which
proves that ω(S) ⊆ ω(S ′). Lastly, if k ∈ ω(S)∩ ω(S ′), then both S, S ′ belong to Wk, and
so they must have a nonempty intersection.
Conversely, assume that ω fulfills the three conditions, and consider Ω = Ψ−1(ω).
Since ω(N) = N , each Wk contains N , and thus is nonempty. Since ω(∅) = ∅, no Wk
contains the empty set. Take any Wk, and consider S ∈ Wk. Then any S
′ ⊇ S belongs
also to Wk, since S ⊆ S
′ implies ω(S) ⊆ ω(S ′). This proves that Wk has necessarily the
form ↑ Sk1 ∪ · · · ∪ ↑ S
k
lk
. It remains to prove that there is no pair of disjoint sets in this
family. Assuming Wk contains at least two subsets (otherwise the condition is void), take
S, S ′ ∈ Wk such that S ∩ S
′ = ∅. Then by (iii), ω(S)∩ ω(S ′) = ∅, which contradicts that
fact that S, S ′ ∈ Wk.
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